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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
APPLICATION OF THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
TO THE COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF
BOOKS AND PAPERS REQUIRED TO
BE KEPT BY STATUTE
The provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act' em-
powered the price administrator to make rules and regulations
regarding the compulsory submission of books and records.
The administrator issued an order which required the keep-
ing of such records as are customarily kept by those firms
coming within the purview of the Act.2 Shapiro, the owner
of a non-corporate wholesale fruit and produce business, was
served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to appear
before the price administrator with certain of his books and
records. Shapiro complied with the subpoena but claimed
constitutional privilege before submitting his books and
records to the administrator. He was later tried and con-
victed for violating the Price Control Act. Conviction was
affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals.3 On appeal Shapiro
contended that the administrator used certain evidence ob-
tained from his books and records to search for the existence
of violations that resulted in his conviction. In a five to
four decision 4 the conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
1. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 60 STAT. 664, 50 U. S. C. App.§ 901 (1946): " ... The Administrator is further authorized, by regula-
tion or order, to require any person who is engaged in the business of
dealing with any commodity, or who rents or offers for rent or acts as
broker or agent for the rental of any housing accommodations, to furnish
any such information under oath or affirmation or otherwise, to make
and keep records and other documents, and to make reports, and he may
require any such person to permit the inspection and copying of records
and other documents, the inspection of inventories, and the inspection of
defense area housing accommodations. The administrator may administer
oaths and affirmations and may, whenever necessary, by subpoena re-
quire any such person to appear and testify or to appear and produce
documents, or both, at any designated place."
2. Maximum Price Regulation No. 426, § 14, 8 Fed. Reg. 9546(1943).
3. Shapiro v. United States, 159 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1947).
4. The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge take issue with the majority on the
question of the extent of the immunity granted by § 202(g) of the Price
Control Act. The majority are confirmed to the view that the immunity
granted by the Act is no greater than that afforded by the Constitution.
This rule is based on the holding of Mr. Justice Holmes in Heike v.
United States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913): "It shall be construed, so far
as its words fairly allow the construction, as coterminous with what
otherwise would have been the privilege of the person concerned." The
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Court on the ground that the records which he was compelled
to produce were records required by law, thus precluding
any constitutional privilege on Shapiro's part. Shapiro V.
United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948).
The application of the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment 5 to the compulsory submission of books
and papers before courts, administrative boards, and con-
gressional committees has often proved to be a stumbling
block to a rapid order of proceedings before these bodies.6
It is clear that a defendant or a witness, if he claims it, has
an absolute privilege against self-incrimination insofar as oral
declarations are concerned.7 This is also true of private books
and papers, but the determination of a proper definition for
private books and papers has plagued the courts for many
years past.8
The maxim, "no person shall be compelled to be a wit-
ness against himself," was first introduced by Coke in 1589
in assailing forced testimony taken from non-conforming
clergymen.9 As first introduced, the privilege applied only
dissenting judges take the view that the constitutional issues involved
here would have been avoided if the immunity provisions of the Price
Control Act were construed to grant something more than the immunity
afforded under the Fifth Amendment. They state that there would be
no purpose to a statutory immunity provision unless it were construed
to grant immunity broader than that afforded by the Constitution. Sha-
piro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 36, 70, 71 (1948). The result of this
interpretation would be to overrule the settled construction of a statu-
tory immunity clause, and it would hamper to a very great extent the
proper enforcement of the Price Control Act as required records must
necessarily be the basis of all enforcement. If the Act could not have
been properly enforced, the resulting inflation would have seriously im-
peded the war effort. In view of this it cannot be said that Congress
intended to protect the individual interest at the expense of the national
interest when the very existence of our country was in jeopardy.
5. U. S. CONST. AMEND. V: "... (no person) shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself..."
6. E.g., United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911); Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186(1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
7. E.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); United
States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v.
Weinberg, 65 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1933), 34 COL. L. Ruv. 173 (1934).
8. Corporate records have been held to be without the privilege in
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911). Contra: 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259(b)
(3d ed. 1940). See also United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d
229 (2d Cir. 1929); 26 HAav. L. REv. 560 (1913); 25 id 96 (1911);
14 MIcH. L. REv. 157 (1915). It is now well settled that the records of
bankrupts are not privileged after they have been given to the trustee
in bankruptcy: Ex parte Fuller, 262 U. S. 91 (1923); 37 HARV. L. REV.
140 (1923); 25 id 573 (1912) ; 19 ILL. L. REV. 290 (1924).
9. Cullier v. Cullier, Cro, Eliz. 201, 78 Eng. Rep. 457 (1589).
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to oral declarations sought to be extorted from witnesses,10
but was subsequently extended to include an individual's
private books and papers."1 The English courts adopted a
broad construction of the phrase "private books and papers"
for they included within the terms of the privilege custodians
of public records required to be kept by law,12 and custodians
of corporate records.13
The privilege against self-incrimination as adopted in our
Constitution is merely an echo of the common law as it existed
in England. 4 However, one fundamental difference soon be-
came evident. The idea that the constitutional privilege is
personal was not inherent in the common law. Thus the
privilege at common law was allowed an individual ordered to
produce the books and papers, even though they were not
his private records.' 5 On the other hand, our law holds the
privilege to be purely personal, thereby imposing a condition
that the records be the claimant's personal property. 6 Con-
10. The first statute on the subject was passed in 1662: "No one
shall administer to any person whatsoever the oath usually called ex
officio, or any other oath, whereby such persons may be charged or
compelled to confess any criminal matter." 13 CAR. II, c. 12 (1662).
11. Rex. v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687, 97 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1765) ; Entick
v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Regina v.
Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927, 92 Eng. Rep. 119 (1704).
12. Rex v. Purnell, I Wils. K. B. 239, 95 Eng. Rep. 595 (1748);
Crew v. Saunders, 2 Strange 1005, 93 Eng. Rep. 997 (1727); Rex v.
Worsenham, 1 Ld. Raym. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (1701).
13. Pritchett v. Smart, 7 C. B. 625, 137 Eng. Rep. 247 (1849) ; King
v. Heydon, 1 Black. W. 351, 96 Eng. Rep. 195 (1762); Rex v. Cornelius,
2 Strange 1210, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1744).
14. For a concise history of the common law on the subject of self-
incrimination see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-
incrimination Clause, 29 Micn. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930); Wigmore, The
Privilege Against Self-incrimination; Its History, 15 HAnv. L. Rav. 610
(1902); Wigmore, Nemn Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 id 71 (1891).
15. In Rex v. Worsenham, 1 Ld. Raym. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370(1701), the keepers of custom house books were granted immunity "be-
cause the said books are a private concern, in which the prosecutor has
no interest; and therefore, it would be in effect, to compel the defend-
ants to produce evidence against themselves." See also notes 12 and 13
supra.
16. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) (custodian of
public records not privileged as to incriminating matter contained
therein). Diet v. Banton, 262 U. S. 147 (1923) (bankrupt not privileged
once his books are given to the trustee in bankruptcy); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921) (documents obtained by a trespasser
not a Federal officer are not privileged); Perlman v. United States,
247 U. S. 7 (1918) (documents offered by defendant in a civil suit are
no longer privileged in a criminal case against him); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911) (custodian of corporate records not privi-
leged as to incriminating matter contained therein).
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sequently the books of a corporation,17 an unincorporated
association,18 and public records", are not private books and
papers of the person producing them.
This distinction between the English and the American
view was set out by the first Congress when it passed the
Revenue Act of July 31, 1789,20 which made it the duty of
a ship's master to present to the collector of customs the
ship's manifest before he was allowed to enter port. Thus
the ship's manifest, which is ordinarily a private record and
therefore personaf to the ship owners, was made a record
required by statute if the ship's master desired to enter a
United States port. Many subsequent statutes required the
keeping and submission of records to facilitate their enforce-
ment.2 1 From 1,789 to 1863 the record-keeping provisions of
these statutes were not questioned, and it was assumed that
they did not come within the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 22
In 1863 an amendment to the Revenue Act of 178923 was
passed which empowered a court to subpoena the private
books and records of a person thought to be involved in frauds
on the revenue; for the purpose of using the information con-
tained therein as evidence against him. For a number of
years the validity of the requirement was upheld by the
lower federal courts.2 4 However, in 1886 the United States
17. E.g., Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Heike v.
United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913); Grant v. United States, 227 U. S.
74 (1913); Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394 (1911); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
18. E.g., United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Brown v.
United States, 276 U. S. 134 (1928).
19. E.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946); Langdon v.
People, 133 Ill. 382, 24 N. E. 874 (1890); Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Commonwealth, 51 S. W. 167 (Ky. 1899); People v. Coombs, 158
N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 527 (1899); State v. Donovan, 10 N. D. 203, 86 N.
W. 709 (1901); State v. Farnum, 73 S. C. 165, 53 S. E. 83 (1905). See
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
20. 1 STAT. 29 (1789).
21. 1 STAT. 199 (1791) (all distillers of spirits required to keep a
record of spirits sold) ; 1 STAT. 397 (1794) (auctioneer required to keep
record of sales made). See also the following statutes to the same
effect: 1 STAT. 627 (1799) ; 3 STAT. 729 (1823) ; 5 STAT. 548 (1842) ; 12
STAT. 737 (1863); 13 STAT. 202 (1864); 14 STAT. 178 (1866); 14 STAT.
546 (1867); 18 STAT. 186 (1874).
22. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623, 624 (1886).
23. 12 STAT. 737 (1863).
24. United States v. Hughes, 26 Fed. Cas. 417, No. 15,417 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1875); In re Platt, 19 Fed. Cas. 815, No. 11,212 (S. D. N. Y.
1874) ; Stockwell v. United States, 23 Fed. Cas. 116, No. 13,466 (C. C.
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Supreme Court in the case of Boyd v. United States,25 its
first decision on the subject, reversed the lower federal courts
and distinguished between records required to be kept which
are incorporated in the revenue act itself, and the submission
of a person's private books and records for the sole purpose
of gathering evidence in connection with the prosecution of
the violators of these laws. 26  Only those statutes which re-
quired the submission of private books and records not re-
quired to be kept by law, for the purpose of securing evidence
to be used against the accused, were held to be unconstitu-
tional.27 Thus the court impliedly upheld the validity of record-
keeping provisions incorporated into statutes prior to 1863.
The rationale of the "required records" exception inher-
ent in the Boyd case was clearly enunciated by way of dictum
in Wilson v. United States .2  In that case Mr. Justice Hughes
said that the privilege does not apply "to records required
by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable infor-
mation of transactions which are the appropriate subjects
D. Me. 1870) (Cases held statutes valid on ground that no greater ob-jection can be taken to a warrant to search for books, invoices and other
papers appertaining to an illegal importation than to one authorizing a
search for the imported goods). United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28
Fed. Cas. 149, No. 16,515 (E. D. Wis. 1875); In re Chadwick, 5 Fed.
Cas. 401, No. 2,570 (D. Mass. 1870) (Cases held statutes valid on
ground proceedings were civil and not criminal). United States v.
Mason, 26 Fed. Cas. 1189, No. 15,735 (N. D. Ill. 1875); United States v.
Distillery No. Twenty Eight, 25 Fed. Cas. 868, No. 14,966 (D. Ind. 1875)
(Cases held statutes valid on ground proceedings were in rem and not
in personam).
25. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
26. Boyd v. United States, supra note 25 at 623, 624: After holding
that books and records seized in an illegal search and seizure could not
be used as evidence against the accused in violation of his rights under
the Fifth Amendment the Court went on to say: ". . . the supervision
authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufact-
ure or custody of excisable articles and the entries thereof in books re-
quired by law to be kept for their inspection are necessarily excepted out
of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures .... Whereas, by
the proceeding now under consideration, the court attempts to extort from
the party his private books and papers to make him liable for a penalty
or to forfeit his property."
27. In the Shapiro case the mere fact that the price administrator
did not specifically name the records required to be kept is not a suffi-
cient ground to take the case out of the records-required-by-law excep-
tion to the constitutional privilege. As long as the duty is created be-
fore the criminal act occurs the custodian of the record is not being
obliged to incriminate himself. The type of statute held unconstitutional
in the Boyd case, which directs the submission of private books and
papers on order of the court requires that these documents be produced
after the act is done. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, n.3 (3d ed. 1940);
Se, Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 590 (1946).
28. 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
19491
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of governmental regulation. ... 29 Subsequent cases have
adopted this theory in their holdings3 °
Although not clearly enunciated by the majority opinion
in the Shapiro case, inherent in it is the theory that a correla-
tion exists between the "required records" exception to the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
validity of economic regulation under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both are dependent upon
the interests of the public being superior to those of the
incfividual.31 As records are usually required to be kept only
in conjunction with a regulatory statute,3 2 the finding of
sufficient public interest to sustain the validity of the regu-
lation should thereby establish the basis for the exception
to the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Shapiro case,
attempts to limit the scope of the "required records" doc-
trine by taking the position that the "required records" ex-
ception as set forth by Justice Hughes in the Wilson case
should be limited to public records in the strict sense of the
word, i.e., records kept by an activity historically considered
29. Wilson v. United States, supra note 28 at 380.
30. E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186(1946); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Essgee Co. v.
United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Wheeler v. United States, 226
U. S. 478 (1913); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit
Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912); Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir.
1946) ; United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (D. Miss. 1947) ; Bowles
v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835 (D. Neb. 1946).
31. As to compulsory production of books and records: "The amend-
ment . . . cannot be applied to regulations which require reports and
disclosures in respect to a business which is affected with a public inter-
est so far as such disclosures may be reasonably necessary for the due
protection of the public." Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350,
3,51, 352 (7th Cir. 1933); In action by Civil Aeronautics Board
plaintiff requested an inspection of defendant's private books to deter-
mine whether defendant was engaged in interstate commerce. The court
held that "permitting the broad discovery herein is the element of
public interest." Civil Aeronautics Board v. Canadian Colonial Air-
ways, 41 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); See also Holcombe
v. State, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941); American Sumatra Tobacco
Co. v. Security & Exchange Commission, 110 F.2d 117 (App. D. C.
1940).
As to due process: "When, therefore, one devotes his property to
a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit .to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126 (1876); "The phrase
'affected with a public interest' can mean no more than that one in-
dustry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 536 (1934); See also Olson v.
Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941).
32. See notes 1 and 21 supra.
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to be public.33 In support of this position Justice Frank-
furter analyzed the cases cited in the Wilson opinion sup-
porting the "required records" exception, and showed that
all the records involved in those cases would fit into his defi-
nition of public records.3 4 From this he concluded that the
exception to the Fifth Amendment set out in the Wilson
dictum was necessarily confined to custodians of public
records.3 5
What Justice Frankfurter fails to consider is that today
statutory regulations extend far beyond loan companies and
druggists, and include the farmer and the small fruit whole-
saler .3  Those cases upon which Justice Frankfurter relied
necessarily were concerned only with the requirement of
public records in the narrow sense, because they were decided
when economic regulation was held to a minimum by a now
out-moded interpretation of the due process clause.3 7 Only
statutes which regulated a small number of activities con-
sidered to be affected with great public interest survived due
33. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 65 (1948).
34. Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382, 24 N. E. 874 (1890) (Seizure
pursuant to search warrant of official state documents unlawfully in
appellant's possession constituted reasonable search. Justice Frank-
furter declared they were not private papers); State v. Smith, 74 Iowa
580, 38 N. W. 492 (1888) (Pharmicist has no privilege as to monthly
reports of liquor sales that he had made to the county auditor pur-
suant to a statutory reporting requirement. Justice Frankfurter de-
clared these reports in the auditor's office are open to the inspection
of all and may be used in evidence in all cases between the parties.
Shapiro's records were in his possession and not open for public in-
spection); State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W. 894 (1892) (Druggist
has no privilege as to prescriptions he filled for sales of intoxicating
liquor. Justice Frankfurter declared these constituted public records
in the pure Wilson sense as the prescriptions belonged to the physicians
and their patients and the druggist was merely their custodian). For
other cases cited and comments by Justice Frankfurter see Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 61, 62 (1948).
35. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 34 at 62.
36. Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 550(1949) (insurance companies recognized as a valid subject of regula-
tion) ; Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941) (employment agencies);
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939) (farmers); Geele v. State, 202
Ga. 381, 43 S. E.2d 254 (1947) (hotels); Fitzpatrick v. State, 316 Mich.
83, 25 N. W.2d 118 (1946) (bartenders).
37. Justice Frankfurter relied on the relationship of a particular
business to the public interest in determining whether a record was
a public record. "Different considerations control where the business
of an enterprise is, as it were, the public's .... Here the subject matter
of petitioner's business was not such as to render it public. Surely
there is nothing inherently dangerous, immoral, or unhealthy about the
sale of fruits and vegetables." Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1,
65 (1948).
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process,38 and presented the problem of self-incrimination in
their enforcement. Today, in effect, all economic activities
are considered to be affected with sufficient public interest
to take them out from under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 39 It is singular that it has never
been held that records required by a statute for the purpose
of facilitating its enforcement, were protected by the Fifth
Amendment when the regulatory provisions of the statute
were held valid under the due process clause.40
Subject to the limitations of due process, 41 it would seem
that Justice Frankfurter is correct when he said that the
majority makes the phrase "'required to be kept by law' . ..
a magic phrase by which the legislature opens the door to
inroads upon the Fifth Amendment." 42 Clearly, the Congress
should not be allowed to legislate away the Fifth Amendment.
Equally undesirable, however, are limitations upon valid
38. Statutes held constitutional under the due process clause: Olson
v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941) (statute fixing maximum charges
of employment agencies); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115
U. S. 512 (1885) (statute requiring the erection and maintenance of
fences and cattle guards); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 313 (1876) (statute
fixing maximum charges for the storage of grain in grain elevators).
Statutes held unconstitutional under the due process clause: New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932) (statute regulating the
sale and distribution of ice); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S.
235 (1929) (statute fixing the selling price of gasoline) ; Tyson & Bro.
v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927) (statute limiting the resale price of
theater tickets).
39. "It is at least fair to say that in the past few years the Due
Process Clause has ambled right out of the U. S. Reports, at least so
far as economic legislation is concerned. . . ." Braden, Umpire to the
Federal System, 10 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 27, 48 (1942); "The due process
clause may be dead so far as it may be a device by which the Court will
overturn legislation in the economic field." Comment, 26 TEx. L. REv.
47, 56 (1947) ; See also 24 IND. L. J. 451 (1949).
40. Neither the Boyd case nor any subsequent case ever held that
records required by statute for the purpose of facilitating its enforce-
ment were private records and thus subject to the constitutional privilege.
They are "quasi-public records" for they are subject to inspection by
those charged with the duty of enforcing the statute and they may be
used for the purpose of enforcing the very statute that requires them
to be made. See, Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719, 721 (10th Cir.
1946); Bowles v. Imsel, 148 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1945); Bowles v.
Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566, 571 (9th Cir. 1945); Bowles
v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835, 843 (D. Neb. 1946); Bowles v. Stitzinger,
59 F. Supp. 94, 96 (W. D. Penn. 1945); Bowles v. Kirk, 59 F. Supp. 97(W. D. Penn. 1945); For a history of the doctrine of "quasi-public
records" see Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 838 (1947).
41. See note 39 supra. Another limitation is that the records must
be relevent to "any matter under investigation or in question." Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 122 F.2d
450, 453 (6th Cir. 1941).
42. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 65 (1948).
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legislative regulation through the application of the self-in-
crimination clause when the reasons behind that clause are
not applicable.
Of late, much opposition has been expressed towards a
tendency to over-extend the privilege by many courts. In
many instances the primary purpose of the privilege, to pro-
tect the innocent from official oppression, has been over-
looked.4 3 Apparently in the Shapiro case a majority of the
Supreme Court felt that the reasons behind the privilege were
not strong enough to outweigh the interest in efficient regula-
tion.4" The courts should prevent a continued abuse of the
privilege against self-incrimination by uniting to keep it
"strictly within the limits dictated by historic fact, cool reason-
ing, and sound policy."4
5
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES
THE EXTENSION OF TRADE NAME PROTECTION
TO NON-COMPETITIVE AREAS
Triangle Publications held a registered trade-mark
"Seventeen" under which it published a fashion magazine
appealing to teen-age girls. Shortly after this name was
registered, Rohrlich and others began marketing girdles un-
der the trade-name "Miss Seventeen." Triangle Publica-
tions sought to enjoin the use of the word "Seventeen" and
asked for an accounting, alleging both statutory trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition. The federal district
court enjoined the use of the word "Seventeen" on the ground
that such use constituted unfair competition and allowed an
accounting. In so ruling, the court found that "Seventeen"
had acquired secondary meaning through Triangle's advertis-
43. "In the past generation and especially in a few Courts, this
practical difference of effect is plainly apparent; for, under the guise
of reasoning and interpretation, the privilege has by them, in a spirit
of implicit favor, been so extended in application beyond its previous
limits as almost to be incredible, certainly to defy common sense." 8
WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940); See also 7 BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 452 (Bowring ed. 1843); STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW 342, 441, 535, 542, 565 (1883); Wig-
more, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Pr'odere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 86 (1891).
44. See, Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE
L. J. 1111 (1947).
45. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
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